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Abstract 
Implicit theories of emotion—assumptions about whether emotions are fixed (entity theory) 
or malleable (incremental theory)—have previously been shown to influence affective 
outcomes over time. We examined whether implicit theories of emotion also relate to the 
immediate regulation of negative affect. Consistent with our hypotheses, we found that the 
more students endorsed an entity theory of emotion, the more discomfort they reported while 
watching an aversive movie clip, the more they avoided affective stimuli in this movie clip, 
the more negative affect they reported after the clip, and the less likely they were to watch the 
same clip again to learn about its ending. These findings suggest that implicit theories of 
emotion might produce poor affective outcomes immediately as well as over time. They also 
offer insight into why some people avoid negative affect while others confront it.   
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Implicit Theories of Emotion Shape Regulation of Negative Affect 
All people inevitably experience upsetting or stressful events throughout life, but they 
differ in how they manage the resulting negative affect. There is a growing body of research 
on how people handle their affective responses (Koole, 2009, for an overview), but rather 
little is known about why some people attempt to regulate negative affect in one way, and 
some people in another. One might wonder, for instance, why some individuals avoid 
negative affect, while others do the opposite.  
We suggest that lay theories about the nature of emotions (Tamir, Srivastava, & Gross, 
2007) impact the strategies people use. Entity theorists see emotions as fixed, running their 
course no matter how hard one might try to alter them. Such an understanding of emotions 
might lead entity theorists to favor an avoidance-centered approach to regulating their affect. 
Specifically, people who believe that emotions cannot be changed might evaluate everyday 
levels of unpleasant affect as negative, perhaps even threatening, since such unpleasant affect 
might indicate the onset of emotions beyond control. Negative evaluations of unpleasant 
affect in turn are central to the unwillingness to experience such affect (i.e., experiential 
avoidance; Hayes et al., 1996; 2006). Entity theorists might therefore be prone to use 
experiential avoidance, potentially seeing it as a self-protective strategy that can prevent 
dreadful consequences (cf. Kashdan, Barrios, Forsyth, & Steger, 2006). 
In light off this reasoning, we suggests that entity theorists might try to influence 
negative affect by avoiding the experiential contact, by, for instance, trying to distract 
themselves from the unpleasant feelings or by trying to suppress the feelings. Subsequently, 
entity theorists might also avoid circumstances similar to those that elicited such affect, trying 
thereby to control the frequency of these emotional reactions. If, for instance, an entity 
theorist has a fear of flying, he might try to avoid thinking about flying, distract himself when 
flying-related thoughts are elicited, and avoid situations that involve talking about flying (e.g., 
a fear-of-flying workshop), as well as avoiding flying itself.  
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Incremental theorists, on the other hand, view emotions as malleable, and susceptible 
to control and change. Such a view of emotions might lead to an acceptance-centered 
approach to affect regulation. In contrast to entity theorists, incremental theorists might not 
evaluate unpleasant affect as negative. Instead, incremental theorists might be interested in 
their affective reactions, since they could potentially gain insight into understanding and 
controlling their emotional states (cf. Whiteside et al., 2007). Hence, events that might bear 
negative feelings should not be avoided per se, but rather should be approached when 
something could be learned. If, for example, an incremental theorist experiences fear of 
flying, instead of distracting herself, she might start wondering about how this fear is elicited, 
and where it is coming from. Furthermore, she should seek out opportunities to learn more 
about her fear, such as a fear-of-flying workshop, and ultimately, she should approach flying 
to test her ideas about the emotion.  
There is some evidence that implicit theories of emotion shape the way people manage 
their affect. Tamir and colleagues (2007) examined the relation between implicit theories and 
affective outcomes over time. Before the beginning of college, students reported their implicit 
theories of emotion (incremental versus entity) as well as their emotion regulation self-
efficacy, and throughout the first year in college, their emotional experiences. At the end of 
the first college year, they also indicated their depressive symptoms and well-being. The more 
that students endorsed an entity theory of emotion at the beginning of college, the lower was 
their emotion regulation self-efficacy, the more negative were their emotional experiences 
throughout the first year, the higher were their depressive symptoms, and the lower was their 
well-being at the end of the year. These findings suggest that entity theorists and incremental 
theorists deploy different regulation strategies, which lead to poor outcomes for the former 
compared to the latter.  
Our predictions are in line with these findings. Avoiding negative affect, as we suspect 
entity theorists to do, leads to poor affective outcomes over time (Plump, Orsillo & Luterek, 
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2004; Shaar & Herr, 2011; Shallcross, Troy, Boland, & Mauss, 2010). For instance, the 
tendency to avoid negative affect—measured before a negative life event—predicts greater 
psychological distress after the negative life event as well as the subsequent development of 
depressive symptoms (Shallcross, Troy, Boland, & Mauss, 2010, Study 2; Shahar & Herr, 
2011). Interestingly, Tamir et al. (2007) found that students with an entity theory of emotion 
had lower emotion regulation self-efficacy compared to students with an incremental theory. 
Such confidence beliefs in turn have been linked not only to experiential avoidance, but also 
to negative evaluations of unpleasant affect (Barlow, Allen, & Choate, 2004; Catanzaro & 
Mearns, 1990; Lazarus, 1991). We theorized that such negative evaluations of affect might 
trigger experiential avoidance in entity theorists. Hence, we suspect that students with entity 
theories might have unfavorable emotional outcomes due to their tendency to avoid negative 
affect in the short-term, and that this tendency is initiated by the negative evaluation of 
unpleasant affect.  
Entity theorists’ experiential avoidance might not only lead to poor affective outcomes 
over time, but also to increases in negative affect after an aversive event. Even though some 
evidence suggests potential short-term benefits (Wegner & Gold, 1995), the majority of 
studies examining the effects of experiential avoidance on subsequent negative affect found 
that avoidance backfires by increasing negative affect, especially in non-clinical samples. For 
example, students high in avoidance of negative affect reported higher negative affect when 
watching an aversive film clip compared to students low in avoidance (Shallcross et al., 2010, 
Study 1, see also Eifert & Heffner, 2003; Feldner et al., 2003, Levitt et al, 2004). Based on 
these results, we expected that the more students endorsed an entity view of emotion the more 
negative affect they would experience after an aversive event, potentially by using 
experiential avoidance throughout the aversive event.   
To test our predictions, we invited female students to a study about movie perception, 
measured their implicit theories of emotion, and then showed them a distressing movie clip, 
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which stopped right before its resolution. Thereafter, we measured multiple facets of 
experiential avoidance. Specifically, we measured participants’ feelings of discomfort during 
the movie clip, their negative affect thereafter, and their self-reported use of avoidance-based 
regulation strategies. Finally, to measure participants’ avoidance of the event itself, we 
offered them the choice between watching the movie clip again, this time with its resolution 
revealed, or watching an entertaining movie clip instead. Hence, students could choose to 
confront the same aversive clip again, or could avoid the clip, but also miss the chance to 
learn more about it.   
We predicted that the more students endorsed an entity view of emotion, the more 
discomfort they would report while watching the aversive movie clip, the more they would 
avoid affective stimuli in the clip, the more negative affect they would report after the clip, 
and the less likely they would be to watch the same clip again, even though this would mean 
forgoing the chance to learn something. 
Method 
Participants 
Eighty-four female university students (M = 24.2 years, SD = 5.5, range 19 to 42) 
participated in return for partial course credit. We recruited only women to reduce the 
variance within the sample, since men and women tend to differ in their emotional reactivity 
(Timmers, Fischer, & Manstead, 1998). All participants were briefed about the potentially 
upsetting nature of the movie clip before the experiment.  
Procedure  
In the beginning, we measured participants’ implicit theories and baseline negative 
affect. Following Campbell-Sills et al. (2006), participants then saw a scene from the movie 
“The Deer Hunter.” The scene was about five minutes long and depicted soldiers being forced 
to play Russian roulette. The soldiers cried and begged for their lives while they were forced 
to put a gun to their head and pull the trigger over and over again. The movie clip ended 
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before it became clear that the two soldiers would survive. Directly thereafter, we measured 
participants’ feelings of discomfort as well as the avoidance of affective stimuli during the 
movie clip and their negative affect. Finally, to observe the subsequent avoidance of the 
upsetting event, students had the chance to either watch a longer version of the previously 
presented movie in order to find out whether the soldiers were able to escape, or to watch an 
uplifting, animated movie clip of the same length called “No Time for Nuts.” 
Materials 
Implicit theories of emotion. The Implicit Theories of Emotion Scale (Tamir et al., 
2007) is based on the Implicit Theories of Intelligence Scale (Dweck, 1999) and assesses 
beliefs about the nature of emotions. It consists of two items referring to the malleable nature 
of emotions, (i.e., “everyone can learn to control their emotions,” “if they want to, people can 
change the emotions that they have”) and two items referring to the fixed nature of emotions 
(i.e., “no matter how hard they try, people can’t really change the emotions that they have,” 
“the truth is, people have very little control over their emotions”) Participants indicated their 
agreement with each statement on a 6-point scale, ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 
(strongly agree). Following Tamir et al. (2007), we averaged the items to form one score (α 
=.79), with higher scores indicating a stronger endorsement of an entity view of emotion.  
Negative affect. We measured participants’ negative affect with the Negative Affect 
Scale of the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS-N, Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 
1988). The PANAS-N consists of ten adjectives pertaining to negative affect (e.g., distressed, 
upset, afraid) which participants rated on a 5-point scale to indicate how they felt at this 
moment. Answers were averaged to form one negative affect score (before the movie clip: α = 
.72, after the movie clip: α = .82).  
Experiential avoidance. We measured different facets of experiential avoidance: 
feelings of discomfort during the movie, avoidance of affective stimuli, and subsequent 
avoidance behavior. To measure feelings of discomfort, participants indicated how often they 
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were bothered by feeling uncomfortable while watching the movie clip on a scale ranging 
from 0 (not at all) to 8 (all the time). To measure avoidance of affective stimuli, participants 
indicated whether they focused on the less emotional details of the film (e.g., the scenery), 
whether they distracted themselves during the movie (e.g., by thinking about other things), 
whether they were interested in getting drawn into the film to really experience it or shifted 
their gaze when seeing something upsetting (reverse coded). Again, participants used a scale 
ranging from 0 (not at all) to 8 (all the time) to rate how often they had applied each strategy 
during the movie clip. We averaged the three items to form one avoidance scale (α = .81).  
Finally, to measure the subsequent avoidance of the upsetting event, we recorded 
students’ choices between watching a longer version of the previously presented movie in 
order to find out whether the soldiers were able to escape (coded 1), or to watch an uplifting, 
animated movie clip of the same length called “No Time for Nuts” at the end of the study 
(coded 2). We selected an up-lifting movie clip as alternative choice, rather than a neutral 
movie clip. We theorized that choosing an uplifting movie clip conveys experiential 
avoidance since it indicates the unwillingness to further experience unpleasant affect. A 
neutral movie clip, in contrast, might be perceived as offering a further opportunity to 
confront current affect since a neutral movie clip does not offer distraction.  
Results 
We excluded three participants because they knew the movie clip and its ending.  
Manipulation Check 
First, we tested whether the movie clip induced negative affect. We computed a 
repeated measures analysis of variance with negative affect as dependent variable and time 
(before the movie clip versus after the movie clip) as within-subject factor. We found the 
predicted main effect of time, F(1,81) = 98.28, p < .0001, with negative affect after the movie 
clip (M = 2.30, SD = .69) higher than negative affect before the movie clip (M = 1.55, SD 
=.42). 
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Implicit Theories of Emotion 
Implicit theories of emotion were measured using a scale ranging from one to six, with 
higher scores indicating a stronger entity theory of emotion. In our sample, students tended to 
endorse the entity view slightly less than the incremental view of emotion, M = 3.16, SD = 
.95; scores ranged from 1.25 to 5.25. These results are similar to the ones found in previous 
research (Tamir et al., 2007). Implicit theories of emotion did not correlate with negative 
affect before the movie, r(82) = -.003, p = .98.  
Implicit Theories of Emotion and Affect Regulation 
Using correlational analysis, we examined whether participants’ implicit theories of 
emotion were related to three outcomes: their negative affect after the movie clip, avoidance 
of affective stimuli, and feelings of discomfort during the movie clip. We controlled for 
negative affect before the movie to ensure that our results were not due to differences in 
negative affect in general (see Table 1 for all the zero order correlations and Table 2 for all 
the partial correlations).  
In line with our predictions, we found that the stronger the belief in an entity theory of 
emotion, the more negative affect participants reported after the movie clip, r(82) =  .31, p = 
.005, controlling for negative affect before the movie. Furthermore, the stronger the belief in 
an entity theory of emotion, the more students avoided the affective stimuli during the movie, 
r(82) = .28, p = .01 , and the more feelings of discomfort they reported having during the 
movie, r(82) = .35, p = .001. Importantly, the relationship between implicit theories and 
feelings of discomfort remained even when additionally controlling for negative affect after 
the movie, r(82) = -.26, p = .02, indicating that implicit theories of emotion were related to 
how much students felt bothered by their negative affect, over and above its intensity.  
Finally, we examined whether participants’ implicit theories of emotion influenced 
their choice of movie clip (i.e., same movie clip again or funny movie clip) at the end of the 
study. We found a marginally significant relationship between implicit theories of emotion 
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and film choice, r(82) = .21, p = .057, indicating that the stronger the belief in the entity 
theory of emotion was, the less often participants chose to watch the same movie clip again to 
learn about its ending.  
Discussion 
We examined whether students’ ideas about the nature of emotions (i.e., implicit 
theories of emotion) predicted the regulation of negative affect during an unpleasant event, 
and affective outcomes as well as avoidance behavior thereafter. As expected, endorsing an 
entity belief about emotions was related to experiential avoidance. The more that students 
believed emotions cannot be changed, the more they were bothered by their negative affect 
during an aversive movie clip, the more they avoided affective stimuli during the clip, the 
more negative affect they reported after the movie clip, and the less likely they were to watch 
the same clip again to learn about its ending. Taken together, these results suggest that 
implicit theories of emotion might lead to poor affective outcomes in the short-term, not only 
in the long run as has been previously found (Tamir et al., 2007). Furthermore, lay theories 
about emotion might play an important role in how people manage aversive events, and how 
people subsequently adapt their behavior.  
Implications 
The present findings imply that implicit theories of emotion might play a role in 
explaining individual differences in affect regulation. Whereas most research on emotion 
regulation focuses on identifying strategies that people in general use to regulate their affect, 
we looked at why people might choose one strategy over another. Our results imply that the 
ideas people hold about the nature of emotion—susceptible to change, or not—influence their 
responses to emotional situations. By providing a framework for evaluating negative affect, 
implicit theories of emotion may guide reactions to aversive events, leading entity theorists to 
avoid the affect, and incremental theorists to accept it. 
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 The presented results in conjunction with previous research also contribute toward a 
better understanding of how implicit theories of emotion shape affect regulation and affective 
outcomes. In the short-term, these theories influence whether people approach or avoid 
negative affect, thereby fashioning their affective outcomes over time. Furthermore, our 
results also suggest that the appraisal of experienced affect is critical for the influence of 
implicit theories of emotion on affect regulation. We found that participants with entity 
theories of emotion judged their negative affect during the movie clip more discomforting 
than incremental theorist. The relationship between implicit theories of emotion and feelings 
of discomfort was still present when controlling for the reported negative affect after the 
movie clip. This finding suggests that it was not merely the comparatively higher intensity of 
negative affect for entity theorists that caused these feelings of discomfort, but rather entity 
theorists’ appraisal of the affect. In support of this idea, previous research found that entity 
theories of emotion are related to low confidence in the ability to control one’s emotions (i.e., 
emotion regulation self-efficacy; Tamir et al., 2007) and such low confidence is related to 
appraising negative affect as threatening (Barlow, Allen, & Choate, 2004; Lazarus, 1991).  
Potential Limitations 
In our study we measured, rather than manipulated, implicit theories of emotion. Our 
results in conjunction with the findings of Tamir et al. (2007) speak to the ecological validity 
of implicit theories of emotion; people do systematically differ in their assumptions about the 
nature of emotion. However, the presented results do not speak to the causal relation between 
implicit theories of emotion and the management of negative affect. One could argue, for 
instance, that participants who tend to avoid negative affect, might, as a consequence form the 
idea that emotions cannot be changed. Hence, entity theories of emotion might be the 
outcome of avoidance, rather than the cause. Speaking against this possibility, extensive 
research on lay theories of personal attributes such as intelligence (Dweck, 1999; Molden & 
Dweck, 2006, for overviews) shows that implicit theories influence appraisals and behavior 
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independent of whether they are manipulated or measured (e.g., Hong et al., 1999). Similarly, 
implicit theories of emotion might establish a framework to understand one’s affective 
reactions, which then guides subsequent behavior. However, it is important for future research 
to manipulate the theories people hold in order to gain more insight into the causal 
relationship between implicit theories of emotion and responses to aversive events.  
 The design of our study had some further limitations. For instance, implicit beliefs 
were measured right before the emotional manipulation and students might have felt that they 
had to report and behave in a way consistent with their previous answers. This is a point of 
particular concern as we did not measure social desirability. However, the items on the 
implicit theories of emotion scale ask participants about their general ideas about the nature of 
emotion (e.g., “the truth is, people have very little control over their emotions”), making it 
harder for participants to guess how they might be connected to other items. Nevertheless, 
measuring implicit theories of emotion at the end and controlling for social desirability in 
future studies would rule out these concerns.   
A strength of our study is that we measured different indicators of poor affect 
management—not only negative affect itself, but also how students felt about the negative 
affect and the strategies they used to regulate the affect. Importantly, we found a consistent 
pattern among these different indicators. However, we measured avoidance and feeling of 
discomfort during the movie retrospectively via self-report and at the same time as negative 
affect. Hence, one might argue that those students who had increased negative feelings after 
the movie would report more feelings of discomfort and more avoidance during the movie 
just to respond consistently. However, we found only small to moderate correlations between 
our dependent variables (see Table 1), suggesting that students were capable of differentiating 
between the various aspects of their affect regulation. Furthermore, we also observed 
spontaneous behavior (i.e., which movie clip students watched the second time). Hence, 
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implicit theories of emotion do not only relate to self-reported indicators of affect 
management, but also to behavioral indicators.  
In the interest of generalizability, future studies should try to incorporate additional 
measures and alternative samples. Such studies might measure, for instance, physiological 
indicators of experienced affect (e.g., heart rate, skin conductance, eye movement) to examine 
how far reaching the effects of implicit theories of emotion are. Such studies could also 
ensure that these effects are present in samples more varied than ours, which consisted only of 
female university students.  
Future Directions 
Better understanding how implicit theories of emotion influence emotion regulation 
has some intriguing implications for interventions and therapy. Obviously, if entity theories of 
emotion lead to experiential avoidance and unfavorable affective outcomes over time, then 
trying to change these ideas about the nature of emotions would be crucial to emotion 
regulation interventions. Research on implicit theories of intelligence not only shows that 
such theories can be changed, but also that doing so helps people to master challenges 
(Blackwell, Trzesniewski, & Dweck, 2007). In therapeutic settings, implicit theories of 
emotion might impact the degree to which clients believe that therapy can help them to 
change certain aversive affective states. These theories might even influence whether a person 
seeks out professional help in the first place. 
Conclusion 
We tested whether lay theories about the nature of emotions shape people’s affect 
management during and after an aversive event. In our study, students who endorsed the view 
that emotions cannot be changed reported stronger negative affect after an aversive movie 
clip, and not only avoided affective stimuli during the movie clip, but also passed up the 
chance to see how the story in the movie clip ended. In spite of some methodological 
limitations, this study offers exciting implications for diverse areas of research on emotion 
IMPLICIT THEORIES 14 
regulation. Understanding the ideas that people have about their emotions might offer the 
chance to help people manage their affect effectively, turning incremental theories about 
emotions into reality. 
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Table 1. Zero-order correlations between the measured variables in the study 
 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 
1. Implicit Theories of Emotion  1 -.003 .29
** .35** .26* .21t 
2. Negative Affect before the Movie Clip  1 .32
** .05 .37** .13 
3. Negative Affect after the Movie Clip   1 .40** .34** .17 
4. Appraisal of Negative Affect    1 .27* .20 
5. Avoidance of Affective Stimuli     1 .40** 
6.  Movie Choice 
      1 
** p < 01, * p < .05, t p <.10, Note that movie choice is coded 1 = wanted to watch movie again, 2 = did 
not want to watch movie again 
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Table 2. Partial correlations between the measured variables in the study, controlling for 
baseline negative affect 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
1. Implicit Theories of Emotion 1 .31
** .35** .28** .21t 
2. Negative Affect after the Movie Clip  1 .41** .25* .13 
3. Appraisal of Negative Affect   1 .27* .19t 
4. Avoidance of Affective Stimuli    1 .38** 
5.  Movie Choice 
     1 
** p < 01, * p < .05, t p <.10, Note that movie choice is coded 1 = wanted to watch movie again, 2 = did 
not want to watch movie again 
 
 
